Using a unique data set of medium and large enterprises (MLEs), which covers four Russian regions and the three sectors manufacturing and mining, construction and trade and distribution, we estimate fixed effects specifications of static labor demand equations for the year 1997. The most important conclusion that can be drawn is that, even though labor demand is relatively inelastic in international perspective, six years into transition Russian MLEs are responsive to wage changes in their employment decisions. A second interesting finding shows that there are distinct differences in the behavior of state-owned enterprises, which exhibit a weaker wage employment tradeoff than privatized and partially privatized firms. Looking at the entire sample and various sub-samples we also try to relate the estimated wage elasticities to the empirical evidence on three of Marshall's rules of derived demand. Our results show that investigating empirically these rules seems a promising avenue for establishing some of the driving forces, which are behind labor demand in Russia.
INTRODUCTION
The transition process to a market economy has been extremely difficult in the Russian Federation. Figure 1 shows the evolution of real GDP, employment and real wages since 1991, where all values are normalized to 100 in 1991. In less than 10 years GDP collapsed by 40% points, with no clear signs of recovery by 1999. The fall in employment was slower, but caught up with the collapse in output towards the end of the 1990s, resulting in employment levels in 1999 at 65% of the pre-transition level in 1991. The collapse in real wages was drastic as can be seen from Figure 1 . By 1999 real wages were not even at 40% of the pre-reform level. The substantial collapse in real wages suggests that if this had not occurred, the collapse in employment would have been even more drastic. It also suggests that wage cuts may have been preferred over employment cuts, provided a well-behaved relationship between wages and employment. This paper uses micro data spanning 1996 and 1997 to analyze labor demand in the Russian Federation. We will focus in particular on the labor demand elasticity with respect to real wages in order to investigate how important wages have been in shaping the employment adjustment process in Russia. We will also point out factors that can explain this relationship, by appealing to Marshall's rules of derived demand.
Most of the studies on labor market adjustment in Russia that use micro data have focused on responses of workers to transition or have used household data to get at firm behavior.
1 But little is known about the actual employment adjustment of firms in response to output shocks and changes in wages. There are four papers that study employment adjustment of Russian firms in the context of gross job flows. Konings and Walsh (1999) and Richter and Schaffer (1997) both use firm level surveys to study gross job creation and destruction in "de novo" and "traditional" firms, while Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) and Brown and Earle (this symposium) analyze the gross flows of "traditional" firms using census-type data. However, none of these papers focuses on the relationship between employment adjustment and wages. Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (2000) look at labor demand in transition countries, including Russia, but the latter country is not at the center of their analysis. Their analysis of Russian labor demand is confined to the early years of transition and uses data from a very small survey of Russian firms.
This paper is to our knowledge the first study that uses a large firm level data set to estimate labor demand in Russia. 2 In the estimations we employ unique censustype micro data of more than 3500 state-owned, privatized and partially privatized firms in four regions of the Russian Federation assumed to be representative of a certain labor market type as we explain below.
Much of the empirical literature on firm adjustment in the early years of transition shows little difference in the behavior of state-owned and privatized firms.
Five years into transition one might wonder whether and how Russian privatized firms differ in their employment decisions from their state-owned counterparts. We will discuss this issue in this paper and, in conjunction with our estimates of wage elasticities, we provide some insights into the nature of the trade off between wages and employment at the firm level in Russia.
The paper is innovative in several respects. By investigating empirically three of Marshall's rules of derived demand, we try to establish whether basic neoclassical theory can give us some guidance in understanding firm behavior in Russia.
Furthermore, the evidence on these rules might help us uncover some of the underlying factors behind labor demand in Russia, which is, after all, a derived demand. In the estimation of labor demand equations we take measurement error
William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392a 4 seriously and use ranking schemes when instrumenting to attenuate the bias due to measurement error. To our knowledge this approach has not been used in the literature on firm behavior in transition economies. The investigation of Marshall's rules involves the estimation of Lerner indices and the imputing of Morishima partial elasticities of substitution, neither of which has been applied to the transition context.
The next section discusses the data set that we use to estimate labor demand.
The third section sketches the derivation of an estimable labor demand equation, based on cost minimization, and discusses estimation issues that are predominantly related to measurement problems and to problems arising from the fact that our data span only two years. Section 4 in turn outlines the procedures used to produce evidence on three of Marshall's rules. Section 5 presents OLS and IV estimates of labor demand equations for the entire sample and various sub-samples, while section 6 reports the evidence on three of Marshall's rules and hence attempts to provide a partial interpretation of the estimated wage elasticities. The final section offers some tentative conclusions.
DATA
The research is based on end-year 1996 and 1997 data for MLEs in four representative regions, the City of Moscow, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Krasnoyarski Krai and Chuvashia (see below). The data on MLEs are census-type data that are collected by Goskomstat and that go back to Soviet times. In the Soviet Union virtually all state-owned enterprises were of medium or large size and had to report certain statistics to Goskomstat on a quarterly or annual basis. After the beginning of the reforms Goskomstat sent modified questionnaires to the same firms accommodating the need for different information in a changed economic environment. Small firms, which hardly existed in the Soviet Union but had been created in large numbers after the economic regime switch, were not covered by any official data collection.
Consequently, starting in 1994 Goskomstat has been sending a questionnaire designed for "small firms" ("malye predpriyatiye") to a random sample of such firms in each administrative region of the Russian Federation. In our assessment, data on MLEs refer, therefore, above all to enterprises that have already existed under central planning and that have continued their activities during transition, while data on "small firms" refer for the most part to firms that have been born after January 1992.
Labor demand of the latter firms is not investigated in this paper.
The characterization of MLEs as enterprises continuing from Soviet times has an important implication. The MLEs come in three ownership categories; they are labeled "state-owned", "private" and "mixed". The vast majority of MLEs that are "private" in our data can be considered privatized firms, while those labeled "mixed"
refer to partially privatized enterprises where private capital is domestically owned and the state still has a stake in the firm. In our assessment, de novo private firms are virtually absent in the used data set and labor demand of these firms is not analyzed here.
The data cover three industries: manufacturing and mining, construction and distribution and trade. They make up the lion share of employment in the nonbudgetary sector of the Russian economy well into the transition and most restructuring in the Russian economy is taking place in these three industries (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001) . By choosing manufacturing and mining, construction and distribution and trade we intend to capture some general patterns of labor demand in Russia.
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The four regions that are covered by our data set are, of course, statistically not representative of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, they are indicative of certain labor market types in Russia, so that our results might have some explanatory power beyond the four regions analyzed. The City of Moscow, while interesting as a labor market in its own right given its status as the capital of the Russian Federation, is also representative of a regional type with a diversified industrial base, is demographically characterized by low natural population growth and little migration activity, and has a registered unemployment rate substantially lower than the average rate in Russia. Chelyabinsk Oblast is representative of those regions dominated historically by the military-industrial complex. There are many settlements in such regions where the labor force is entirely dependent on huge multi-profile enterprises,
i.e. where local labor markets might exhibit monopsonistic elements. Despite a dramatic fall in production, registered unemployment has been relatively low in these regions as a high level of hidden unemployment has been maintained through much of the nineties by implicit or explicit subsidies from the federal budget. Krasnoyarski
Krai is typical of the industrially developed regions dominated by extractive industries, such as oil and gas extraction, timber production, and fisheries, with agriculture practically absent. Output in these regions has fallen less rapidly than the average for the Federation. The demographic situation is characterized by a low rate of natural population growth and a high level of outward migration, which has risen substantially during the years of economic reform. Most of these regions are in the northern European and Asian parts of the country and make up a considerable proportion of the Russian Federation. Chuvashia reflects the economic situation of agro-industrial areas where processing plants are the main form of industrial enterprise. These areas are not well endowed with minerals and energy sources. A relatively high natural population growth and a low degree of labor mobility are observed in these regions. The fall in industrial and agricultural production has been greater than the average in the Russian Federation. The infrastructure of social services is underdeveloped while the level of registered unemployment is much higher than the Russian average.
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Our data set is rich, containing many variables on employment, variables on sales, labor costs and material costs as well as variables on balance sheet items.
However, it is important to note that we have not enough information in our data set to calculate unit cost of capital and unit cost of material inputs. This lack of information influences our estimation strategy. A brief description of the variables used in our empirical work is provided in appendix 1.
Those variables that are particularly interesting in connection with the estimation of labor demand equations for the total sample and various sub-samples are presented in Tables 1-3 . While it is hard to disentangle how firms adjust their employment in response to wage changes from these cross tabulations, one fact emerges very clearly from them. All types of firms in the covered regions and sectors experience on average a very large negative output shock, to which they respond with substantial labor shedding.
LABOR DEMAND AND THE RUSSIAN LABOR MARKET
One way to derive labor demand is based on cost minimization, under the constraint that a given output level has to be produced with the technology available.
If total costs are assumed to be the sum of products of the cost-minimizing input demands and factor prices and if total costs are assumed to be linearly homogeneous in the latter, then the total cost function can be written as C = C ( w, r, m, Q).
Where C are total costs, w the real wage, r the real user cost of capital, m the real unit material cost and Q real output. Using Shepard's lemma,
where N * is the cost-minimizing demand for the input labor and C w is the partial derivative of the total cost function with respect to labor 7 . Equation (2) can be written
Log-linearizing equation (3) one gets an easily estimable equation that yields the constant-output own price elasticity of demand for labor, the cross-elasticities of labor demand, as well as the employment-output elasticity. One problem with the data at our disposal is that we have no information on the unit cost of capital, nor on the unit cost of material inputs, which implies that we cannot measure r and m. We therefore assume that the unit cost of capital and the unit cost of material inputs do not vary over time, but may rather vary between different firms. This allows us to capture these unit costs in an unobservable firm level fixed effect, which gives the following empirical estimable equation for labor demand in firm i at time t,
where small letters of the variables now refer to natural logarithms, ε it is a white noise error term and δ i is an unobservable firm level fixed effect. The subscripts denote firm i at time t. The firm level fixed effect may also capture other unobservable factors.
Estimating equation (4) in first differences to control for the unobserved fixed effect, we get
Equation (5) will form the basis of our analysis, which we estimate for the overall sample of Russian firms and for various sub-samples. By estimating equation (5) we can consistently estimate the wage elasticity, β 1 , while at the same time we control for the unobserved firm level fixed effect, which captures various aspects of firm heterogeneity. Before we go on to Marshall's rules we need to discuss various conceptual and econometric issues related to the specification and the estimation of equation (5).
Marshall's rules are valid when the economy is in equilibrium, i.e. in the long run. We understand "long run" in connection with equation (5) as a steady state, corresponding to a static labor demand equation. One could argue, of course, that the Russian economy was not in equilibrium in 1997 as the build-up of various arrears that already occurred in that year and that lead to the August 1998 crisis was a reflection of profound structural imbalances (Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov, 2000) .
On the other hand, the year 1997 saw several macro variables being close to a steady state; e.g. the interest rate on Euro bonds, the effective exchange rate, price indices and the unemployment rate changed very little during this year, while real output rose slightly for the economy as a whole (OECD, 2000) . This does not, of course, mean that equation (5) captures truly an equilibrium relationship, especially when applied to our sample where both average real output and average employment fall substantially.
Nevertheless, we assume that equation (5) represents a steady state situation and use it as a benchmark to inspect the evidence on Marshall's rules. To model labor adjustment properly we would need a longer panel in order to derive an estimable dynamic model. The data at our disposal do not allow such a rich dynamic specification because we only have two years of data available.
The second issue that needs to be touched upon is how firms like those in our sample interact with the labor market and how this is related to the specification of equation (5) and to the estimation methods used. The dramatic fall in output and the lack of its recovery for the analyzed firms throughout the nineties motivate our empirical strategy to treat output as exogeneous when estimating equation (5). We would also argue that the sharp decline in real wages of the nineties makes it unlikely that workers and managers bargain over wages in our sample of "traditional firms."
The majority of workers have been confronted periodically with large cuts in real wages, which they seem to have tolerated. Firms, therefore, seem to pay to most workers a "competitive" real wage, which we treat as exogeneous in equation (5).
The labor demand equation that we estimate has a very simple specification, which in turn is based on a very simple model of cost minimization. Assuming cost minimization as the main driving force behind managers' behavior strikes us as a more reasonable assumption in the Russian context than profit maximization.
However, a more complex labor demand equation based on cost minimization can be derived if we assume that firms face quadratic adjustment costs. This assumption leads to a specification where equation (5) is augmented with the change in the log of capital and of material costs as additional regressors. We estimated such equations for the full sample and the various sub-samples that we discuss below. The point estimates of the own wage elasticities did not change in a statistically significant way, even though the change in the log of capital was highly significant.
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Another issue that needs to be addressed before we proceed is wage arrears in Russia. Earle and Sabirianova (2002) and Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1999) provide convincing evidence that large parts of the workforce are affected by them.
As we use the contractual wage bill to calculate average wages at the firm level, it is important to understand whether by using the contractual (or the accrued) wage bill in our calculations we bias our wage measure in a substantial way. To get an idea of the magnitude of the measurement error associated with wage arrears one needs to look at the dynamics of wage arrears. Both cited papers and Lehmann and Wadsworth (2001) find some evidence that many persons who suffer from wage arrears are paid back the arrears over a given calendar year. For many workers wage arrears is, therefore, not a problem of having their pay permanently withheld but a problem of irregular pay.
Since we use the annual wage, measurement error associated with wage arrears is certainly attenuated.
Some error in the measurement of wages, but also in output will remain, though. We try to correct for this by instrumenting ∆w it and ∆q it using ownership and regional dummies and in particular instruments that use two ranking schemes of the variables in question. Instruments that use ranking schemes are considered especially appropriate when right hand side variables are measured with error (Bowden and Turkington, 1984) . The first ranking scheme that we use is due to Durbin (1953) . We rank the changes in log wage and log output and use this rank as an instrument.
Intuitively the rank should be highly correlated with the properly measured variable, but not with the measurement error as long as this error is not too large, thus providing a good instrument. When large measurement error is present it might be better to use Bartlett's (1949) scheme. Bartlett suggests to divide the sample in three groups according to the rank of the improperly measured variable and then use the upper and lower group means to estimate the coefficients, while ignoring the middle group. This amounts to Instrumental Variable estimation, using as an instrument -1 for the lower group, 0 for the middle group and +1 for the upper group. While IV estimation using Bartlett's rankings might be less efficient, it is less sensitive to large measurement error. We, therefore, employ in our regressions OLS and both IV estimation procedures, test the validity of the instruments using a test of overidentifying restrictions and then perform a Hausman test to see whether the OLS estimates are consistent. In some cases, the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates. Therefore, we report the results of all three estimation methods in our labor demand regressions.
EVIDENCE ON MARSHALL'S RULES
The four rules of derived demand can be synoptically summarized as follows (Hamermesh, 1992; Hicks, 1968) : Ceteris paribus,
(1) the lower the labor share in total costs, the lower the own wage elasticity; 9 (2) labor demand is less elastic when the demand for the product, for which labor is used as an input, is less elastic;
(3) the lower is the substitution elasticity between labor and other factors, the lower is the own price elasticity; (4) labor demand is less elastic, the less elastic is the supply of other factors of production.
The data that we have at our disposal do not allow us to rigorously test these rules. Instead, we use the empirical evidence that we can generate to see whether there are empirical patterns that suggest a nexus between wage elasticities and Marshall's rules. The fourth of these rules cannot be investigated given our data. Since we do not have unit material costs and capital user cost we cannot estimate supply functions of the other factors of production.
Labor shares, on the other hand, can easily be estimated with our data. We can readily compute sales, total material costs and the wage bill in real terms. We then arrive at two measures of labor share, the first one using the ratio of the wage bill over sales, while the second one divides the wage bill by value added, i.e. by sales minus material costs. While the second measure might be preferred as the one commonly used in the literature, it could be affected by particularly large measurement error of the variable material costs.
The estimation of product demand is somewhat less straightforward. Our strategy is to produce estimates of the "Lerner Index", i.e. estimates of the price cost margin, which is equivalent to the inverse of the product demand elasticity. Our methodology is based on Hall (1988), Domowitz et al. (1988) and Roeger (1995) . We start from a standard production function
, where i is a firm index for the firm, t is a time index, Θ is the level of productivity, N is labor, K is capital and M is material input.
Under perfect competition, it is well known that the growth rate of output can be decomposed as follows: Under imperfect competition, Equation (6) becomes (Hall, 1986) :
where c p = µ is the markup of price over marginal cost.
This can also be written:
It is also possible to derive a similar expression for the price based, or dual Solow residual (Roeger, 1995) :
Then subtracting (9) from (8) 
Rewriting the left hand side as y ∆ and the right hand side as x ∆ , one obtains a very simple testable equation:
, where we have imposed the same coefficient for all firms. 10 We shall use Equation (10) to estimate the Lerner index or the inverse of the product demand elasticity. This methodology allows us to use nominal values of the variables and the Lerner index can be estimated consistently using OLS (Roeger, 1995) . The methodology is similar to Levinsohn (1993) and Konings et al. (2001) . OLS estimation produces consistent estimates with Roeger's method when measurement error of the right hand side variables is not a major issue.
In our Russian sample of firms, values of total sales, capital stock and material costs might be measured with substantial error. Instrumenting these variables using the Durbin and Bartlett ranking schemes and ownership or regional dummies, we present OLS and IV estimates of the Lerner index.
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In order to estimate the partial elasticities of substitution between the three input factors labor (N), capital (K) and materials (M), we need to assume a flexible enough underlying production function with non-constant elasticities of substitution.
We choose, therefore, the three input translog production function, which we estimate in first differences to control for an unobserved firm-level fixed effect. We then use the coefficient estimates from this translog production function to impute the marginal products of the inputs. These imputed marginal products in turn allow us to construct the bordered Hessian, which is used to calculate the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticities of substitution (AES). In a final step, we derive the Morishima partial elasticities of substitution (MES) from the AES. A formal exposition of the derivation of the MES is given in appendix 2.
In investigating the third of Marshall's rules, we are particularly interested in the "ease" of input substitution for a given subset of firms. Blackorby and Russel (1989) show that when the number of inputs exceeds two, the MES and not the AES are capable of capturing this ease of substitution. A second feature of the MES consists in the asymmetry of the partial elasticities, while the AES are symmetric.
With MES, the change in the ratio of two inputs i and j can be different in magnitude and even in its sign if either the price of input i or the price of input j changes as one takes into account the effect of this price change on other inputs. 12 This asymmetry that one can get in the case of the Morishima partial elasticities also implies that two inputs can be classified as substitutes and complements at the same time, depending on which of the input prices changes. We use this property of the MES to investigate
Marhall's third rule with our data set looking at the following partial elasticities:
MES NK , MES KN , MES NM and MES MN . When all partial elasticities are positive, labor always enters the production function as a substitute of the other two inputs capital and materials. When some of the partial elasticities show negative values, on the other hand, labor becomes at times a complement of the other two inputs. This latter case is taken as evidence that as the price of one of the inputs changes the firm, which is assumed to be cost minimizing and producing a given level of output, has less flexibility in substituting inputs. Given our limited data, we prefer this somewhat "qualitative" interpretation of the MES to a strictly "quantitative" interpretation, which would rank partial elasticities strictly by magnitude, when comparing subsamples.
RESULTS: LABOR DEMAND
Tables 4 -7 report estimated labor demand equations for the total data set of MLEs and for various sub-samples. Below the coefficients the standard errors are shown in parentheses. In all tables we give the results of OLS and two variants of IV estimation, where the first one uses Durbin's ranking scheme ("IV-Durbin") and the second one that of Bartlett ("IV-Bartlett"). We also present the probability values of two chi square test statistics, related to a test of over-identifying restrictions (OIR test) and to a Hausman test. A probability value of greater than 0.10 in the case of the OIR test indicates that the instruments are valid, i.e. that they are not correlated with the error term of equation (5). We also run auxiliary regressions with the regressors as left hand side variables and the instruments as right hand side variables and find very high F-statistics when testing the joint insignificance of the latter variables. These high Fstatistics point to a high correlation of these two sets of variables, so the second condition for being good instruments seems to be fulfilled. 13 A probability value of less than 0.10 for the Hausman tests indicates that there is a systematic difference between the OLS and the IV coefficients and that the OLS estimate might be inconsistent. The own wage and the output elasticities are in virtually all cases estimated with great precision as a quick glance over Tables 4-7 makes clear. This great precision has two implications. On the one hand, we can be very confident in our estimates and, on the other hand, the Hausman test can reject the null hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates even if these estimates are very close to the IV estimates.
The estimated wage elasticity for the total sample is roughly -0.18, while the output elasticity is approximately 0.28, when we focus on the estimates of the IVDurbin regression. Both these elasticities are low by Western standards, although they do fall in the range reported in the Western literature (see Hamermesh, 1992 Our research strategy tries to detect systematic differences across various subsamples and relate these differences to the empirical evidence on Marshall's rules. We start with the regressions by ownership type (Table 5 ). As we are interested in detecting systematic differences in the wage elasticities across sub-groups, we perform chi square tests of equal pair wise elasticities under the null hypothesis. 14 The bottom panel of Table 5 gives the probability values of these tests performed for firms with different ownership structure. The wage elasticity of state-owned firms is in absolute value lower than the wage elasticities of mixed and privatized firms, while the output elasticities are roughly the same for state-owned and mixed, but substantially higher for privatized firms. The difference in the wage elasticity between state-owned and mixed firms is highly significant and marginally significant between state-owned and privatized firms. Since our test shows no significant difference in the wage elasticities of mixed and privatized firms, we take this as evidence that among The estimates of labor demand for the three sectors show a slightly higher wage elasticity in absolute value for construction and equal elasticities for manufacturing and trade (Table 7) . The three percentage point difference that we observe between construction and the other two sectors is, however, statistically not significant as the chi square statistics in the bottom panel show.
In summary, the evidence seems to point to ownership structure and regional location as the main determinants of differences in wage elasticities. Six years into the transition, partially privatized and, to a lesser degree, fully privatized firms exhibit a more pronounced wage employment trade-off than do state-owned firms. Labor demand in Chelyabinsk and Krasnoyarsk is significantly more elastic than labor demand in Moscow. Whether Marshall's rules of derived demand can shed some light on these two results will be discussed in the next section.
RESULTS: EVIDENCE ON MARSHALL'S RULES
We first look at two measures of average labor share for the overall data set and the various previously discussed sub-samples (Table 8) . Labor shares are defined either as the wage bill divided by total sales or as the wage bill divided by value added. For the sample as a whole the calculated average shares are 26% and 35%
respectively, both of which are relatively low by Western standards. So, for the sample as a whole the first of Marshall's rules seems to be fulfilled as a relatively inelastic labor demand coincides with a relatively low labor share.
To see whether we get a consistent pattern within the sample, we compare wage elasticities and the two measures of labor share at the disaggregated level. respectively, neither of which is statistically significant. Slicing the data by sector provides no insights into the nexus of wage elasticities and labor shares.
The estimates of the Lerner Index, are given in Table 9 . The OLS and IV estimates are quite close with the exception of one estimate (construction). The slightly higher values of the IV estimates, all of which are highly significant, indicate the existence of measurement error. We, therefore, concentrate on the IV estimates in our discussion of Table 9 . The estimate of 0.46 of the Lerner index for the overall sample implies an elasticity of product demand equal to 2.27. Using firm level data, Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2001) estimate a product demand elasticity of 4.5 for Belgium and of 2.9 for the Netherlands, which is known to have an economy with one of the most developed cartel structures. So our estimate of product demand in the four Russian regions, hinting at strongly monopolistic product market structures, implies that a relatively inelastic product demand contributes to the low labor demand elasticity.
To investigate the driving forces behind this low product demand elasticity we compare the Lerner indices within the three data groupings. Mixed firms have on average a product demand elasticity, which is more than twice as large as that of stateowned and fully privatized firms. The results in Table 5 While competitive pressure in Russia might have an important regional dimension, as suggested by Brown and Earle (2000) , it is hard to think of purely regional factors that make product markets in Moscow less elastic than elsewhere. What could explain less elastic product demand in Moscow is, again, the heavy concentration of state-owned firms in our Moscow sample. The estimated Lerner indices for sectors show no sensible patterns and cannot be related to the estimated wage elasticities in a simple fashion. As differences in wage elasticities across sectors are not statistically significant anyway, these product elasticities will not be discussed any further.
Marhall's second rule is, however, borne out by the results when the data are sliced by region and, to a lesser degree, by ownership.
In a last step, we attempt to see to what extent the underlying production technology, which firms have, might drive the estimated wage elasticities. In the three-input case we need to look at the Morishima partial elasticities of substitution (MES) in order to get an idea of the ease, with which factors of production can be substituted while output is held constant. However, it is hard to visualize in three dimensional space, how the ratio of two inputs changes as a consequence of the price change of one of the inputs when this price change also affects the third input. Also, in the three-input case we have four MES that involve labor and one might find it quite difficult to link the imputed values of these four MES unequivocally to the notion "ease of substitution of inputs" for various sub-groups of firms. 17 Given our data limitations, it certainly would seem presumptuous to try this. Instead, we take advantage of the asymmetry property of MES, which can lead to the classification of input i as a substitute and a compliment of input j, depending which of the two input prices is changed. Our essentially qualitative classification scheme then stipulates that a sub-group of firms exhibits a production technology with relative ease of substitution between labor and the other two input factors, if all four MES that involve labor are positive, i.e. if labor is always a substitute for the other two factors, no matter which input price changes. We have a production technology of less flexible input use, if at least one of the MES is negative, i.e., if at least once labor is used in a complementary fashion.
Given such a qualitative classification approach, we see in Table 10 that stateowned firms clearly exhibit a production technology characterized by less ease of substitution than do mixed and fully privatized firms. In the case of the former, labor alternates between being a substitute and a complement, while in the latter two forms of ownership labor is always a substitute. We get a similar dichotomous classification for regions. Firms in our Moscow sample have more difficulties to substitute labor for the other inputs than have firms in Chelyabinsk and Chuvashia. 18 Again, this should be explained with the disproportionate share of state-owned enterprises, especially since the imputed MES for the three sectors do not allow us to discriminate on the criterion of ease of substitution of labor with other input factors. In summary, it transpires from Table 10 that state-owned firms, which have on average a more inelastic demand for labor, can substitute labor less easily with other inputs than can firms of other ownership types. Marshall's third rule is borne out by the data quite convincingly, if one follows this approach.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we use a unique enterprise-level data set, which covers the regions Moscow City, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk and Chuvashia and the three sectors manufacturing and mining, construction and trade and distribution to estimate static labor demand equations for the year 1997. While the results are tentative we can make some conclusions with confidence.
There are three important conclusions that can be drawn from the estimated own wage elasticities. First, labor demand is relatively inelastic in international perspective, although the estimated wage elasticity for the whole sample of -0.18 is within the range reported in empirical studies in the Western literature. Secondly, this estimate also implies that six years into transition Russian firms on average do respond to wage changes by adjusting employment. Thirdly, the estimated wage elasticities provide some evidence that state-owned firms, which have on average a more inelastic labor demand than privatized and partially privatized firms, are performing differently than firms with other ownership structure. They are much more sluggish in their employment responses to wage changes than privatized and partially privatized firms.
Linking these results to Marshall's rules of derived demand for the whole sample and across various subsets of our sample we find some convincing evidence that lower product demand and less ability to substitute labor for capital and materials is contributing to the more inelastic labor demand of state-owned firms. In future work we will use a dynamic specification of labor demand, once more data points for our sample of MLEs in the four Russian regions become available. While our research on Russian labor demand is still at an early stage, the paper establishes the encouraging result that investigating Marshall's rules of derived demand seems a promising avenue for establishing some of the driving forces, which are behind labor demand in Russia.
APPENDIX 1 Description of Russian enterprise level data
The data are enterprise level data for large and medium sized firms in the regions of Unit wage cost in 1996: total wage bill in 1996 divided by employment of 1996.
Output in 1997: production output in current prices (without VAT, excise and special tax) for the reporting year.
Output in 1996: production output in current prices (without VAT, excise and special tax) for the previous year.
Capital in 1997: fixed capital at the end of the reporting year 1997.
Capital in 1996: fixed capital at the beginning of the reporting year 1997.
Material inputs in 1997: total material costs (raw materials + semi-finished parts + fuel and energy) for the reporting year.
Material inputs in 1996: total material costs for the previous year.
Appendix 2 -Derivation of Morishima Partial Elasticities of Substitution using a three-factor Translog Production Function
• We control for unobserved heterogeneity by differencing a Fixed Effects model of the translog production function with the inputs labor (N), capital (K) and materials (M): • The Allen partial elasticities of substitution (AES), ij σ , are then derived using the following ratios:
where G is the determinant of the three-factor translog bordered Hessian: G is the cofactor of ij G in G. These AES are symmetric as can be seen from the bordered Hessian.
• The Morishima partial elasticities (MES),
M ij
σ , can then be computed easily,
where i x are average log inputs, instrumented using its rank and ownership dummies, ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆q it is instrumented using its rank and ownership dummies. N=3584. IV-Durbin uses individual rankings to instrument variables; IV-Bartlett uses grouped rankings to instrument variables (see text for details). OIR-test stands for test of over-identifying restrictions. Note: Robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors in brackets, ** denotes statistically significant at the 1% critical level. Note: The Spearman rank correlation coefficients between wage elasticities in different ownership types, regions, sectors and the first (second) raw wage labor share are equal to -0.5 (0.5), 0.2 (0.2) and 0.09 (-0.09) respectively; however, none are statistically significant at conventional levels. Number of firms is given in parentheses. Note: Elasticities for total sample are based on OLS regression; elasticities for subsamples are based on two stage least squares regression.
1 See for example Newell and Reilly (1996), Foley (1997) , Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) , Earle and Sabirianova (2002) and Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1999) .
2 Luke and Schaffer (2000) test wage determination models in Russia employing the same data set. This paper also summarizes the major data cleaning effort undertaken by Peter Luke in connection with these data.
3 MLEs are officially defined by the Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) as those firms employing over 100 employees in manufacturing and mining, construction or transportation, and over 50 employees in the wholesale trade or over 30 in the retail trade. Inspection of the data set shows, however, that the average annual employment of quite a few MLEs falls below the cited lower bounds. This is another reason why one might want to characterise MLEs as firms existing already before transition. 4 For a more detailed discussion of this regional taxonomy see Lehmann, Gontmakher and Starodubrovskyi (1999) . 5 To deflate nominal values we take 1995 as a base year. Here and in the subsequent analysis we excluded firms with labor shares greater than one. 6 This does not preclude, of course, that we find such a trade-off once we condition on output.
7 This function is also consistent with models of imperfect competition in the product market.
8 These regressions are not shown here, but are available from the authors on request. The robustness of the point estimates of the own wage elasticities can be explained by the fact that in the sample the change in the log of capital and the change in the log of real wages are only weakly correlated.
